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fault, the CCP calculates the termination amount
on its side of the market. Given the back-to-back
relationship Client has with Clearing Member, economically speaking it takes the opposite side of
the trade to the CCP. This means that the amount
due to/payable by the Client will have been calculated on the other side of the market, even where
Clearing Member is the defaulting party. The Client always pays the spread on close-out.
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Ask The Professor:
How Will The
Seventh Circuit
Rule in Sentinel II

Aword on collateral

BY RONALD H. FILLER'

Collateral arrangements are addressed only in
broad-brush terms in the Addendum, and this is an
area on which all parties will wish to focus. Under
the standard terms, if the documentary framework
to which the Addendum is attached is an ISDA
Master Agreement, any existing collateral terms
will be disapplied and a basic clearing-compatible
CSA (with terms pre-completed by ISDA to correspond with the Addendum, a version of which is
being released) will be deemed to apply.
Parties will wish to consider whether these
terms reflect their best negotiated position, andat a minimum-whether they reflect the practicalities of their collateral arrangements. As a consequence of the above, it should be noted that the
Addendum default terms mean that any collateral
transferred will constitute a title transfer financial
collateral arrangement-and there is a provision
extending this effect to collateral arrangements
under non-ISDA documents which would otherwise not be captured by the deemed CSA described above.
CCP product offerings will also affect the collateral arrangements between Clients, Clearing
Members and CCPs, and the documentary and
practical arrangements surrounding those products will need to be considered alongside the Addendum collateral provisions.
Collectively, the above demonstrates the need
for market participants to review and negotiate
the Addendum with care. This is a complex and
time-consuming process, and the volume of trading arrangements which need to be migrated to
the cleared environment before the mandatory
clearing deadline comes into effect under EMIR
in 2014 means that the Addendum has not been
published a moment too soon.

On January 4, 2013, Judge James Zagel ruled
that $14,479,000 that had been distributed to
the Customer Segregated Account2 of FCStone
in August 2007, must be returned back to the
bankrupt estate of Sentinel Management Group
("Sentinel"). 3 In August 2007, pursuant to a
Court Order,4 funds had been distributed out
of the bankrupt estate of Sentinel5 directly into
Customer Segregated Accounts of several Futures
Commission Merchants ("FCMs"), including the
afore-mentioned Customer Segregated Account
of FC Stone, the Defendant in this case.6 None of
the funds were distributed directly to these FCMs.
Sentinel was an unusual FCM in that it did not
engage in futures trading activities on behalf of
its customers.7 Sentinel was registered as a Futures Commission Merchant ("FCM") solely to
receive customer assets held by other FCMs. 8
Sentinel, in essence, primarily provided an asset
management investment service for two primary
groups, namely (1) other FCMs which invested
futures customer assets that they held in their respective Customer Segregated Accounts into the
Sentinel Customer Segregated Account which, in
turn, invested such assets as permitted by Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")
Rule 1.259 (hereinafter referred to as the "SEG
1 Pool"), and (2) other private investors, including hedge funds and even non-customer assets
of FCMs (hereinafter referred to as the "SEG 3
Pool"). 10 Accordingly, Sentinel was also registered
as an investment adviser under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940. 11
The following activities took placed during the
period of August 13-21, 2007: 12
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Frederick J. Grede was appointed as the
Liquidation Trustee of the Sentinel estate on
December 17, 2007, some four months after
the proceeds of the Citadel sale were distributed to the Customer Segregated Accounts
of the various FCMs that invested their customer assets in the SEG 1 Pool. 16 In September 2008, Mr. Grede brought this action to
claw back the assets that were distributed to
the SEG 1 Pool in August 2007 under the
theory that the assets belonged pro rata to
both the SEG 1 Pool and the SEG 3 Pool.17

1. Around August 13, 2007, Sentinel sent letters to its customers stating that it had halted redemptions.
2.

Nevertheless, Sentinel did start to distribute
certain assets to its FCM customers who invested in the SEG 1 Pool.

3. Sentinel filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code on August 17, 2007.
4.

On August 16, 2007, Sentinel started to
sell a large amount of its portfolio to Citadel Trading ("Citadel"). These sales were
eventually permitted by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court. 13

5.

On August 20, 2007, Sentinel filed an emergency order with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking
an order approving the distribution of the
proceeds of the securities sold to Citadel. 14
This Order was supported and approved by
both the CFTC and the National Futures
Association ("NFA").

6.

On August 21, 2007, approximately $297
million of the assets managed by Sentinel
were distributed directly into the Customer
Segregated Account of the 14 FCMs that
had invested their futures customer assets
into the SEG 1 Pool. Of this amount, approximately $14,479,000 was distributed
directly into the Customer Segregated Account of FCStone. Only a small amount was
distributed to customers who had invested
their assets in the SEG 3 Pool.

7. During the period of August 15-21, 2007,
the amount distributed to the FCM Customer Segregated Accounts that had invested in
the SEG 1 Pool represented approximately
32 % of the total of the assets under management by Sentinel. If the distributions made
to the FCM customer segregated accounts
had been made on a pro rata basis, then applying this 32 % test, FCStone would only
have received $6,977,653 (versus the larger
amount that was transferred into its Customer Segregate Account as noted above). 15

Judge Zagel agreed with the Trustee and held,
in essence, as follows:

1. The custody rule adopted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") pursuant to the IAA, namely SEC Rule 206(4)-2,
created a statutory trust protection as robust as those set forth under the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") and applicable
CFTC regulations. Therefore, the SEG 3
Pool customers have an equally forceful
claim to trust protection as the SEG 1 Pool
customers.
2.

FCStone, as the Defendant, is subject to
common law tracing requirements due to
the co-equal claims of the competing trust
claimants.

3. The assets distributed to the Customer Segregated Accounts of the various FCMs back
in August 2007 are property of the Sentinel bankrupt estate and were not "customer
property" as defined by the CEA and applicable CFTC regulations.
4. The distribution made back in August 2007
to the FCStone's Customer Segregated Accounts was not authorized under the Bankruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy Court.
This paper will discuss each of these legal conclusions and analyze the economic impact of the
Sentinel decision on the U.S. futures .markets. It
will also examine the various briefs filed before
the Seventh Circuit in this case and will thus
attempt to determine how the Seventh Circuit
might rule on the case on appeal.
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THE FUTURES MARKETS
IN GENERAL
The U.S. futures markets play an important
economic role by permitting commercial end users to hedge their inventory, production and consumption activities through standardized futures
contracts that consist of a variety of financial, agricultural, energy and other monetary end products. Historically, these futures contracts dealt
primarily with traditional agricultural products,
such as corn, wheat and soybeans, but, today,
financial futures involving interest rates, stock
indices and currency futures comprise more than
80% of the daily volumes. A large asset manager
can now easily hedge its investment market risks
through a variety of financial products, including
the S&P 500 Stock Index futures contract. 18 If
you're not a hedger, 19 then you are deemed to be
a speculator.
Futures customers must open their futures account with a Futures Commission Merchant
("FCM"). Unlike bank accounts that are protected by FDIC insurance and stock accounts that
are protected by SIPC insurance (both insurance
plans paid by the U.S. government),20 futures customer accounts receive no such insurance protection. 21 Therefore, Congress in 1936 adopted
Section 4d(a) of the CEA to protect futures customers from any fraudulent or improper use of
their assets by FCMs. 22 The CFTC, the federal
regulatory agency which has exclusive jurisdiction over the U.S. futures markets and FCMs,23
has issued various regulations that have provided
further customer protections. In fact, until just
recently with the failures of MF Global and Peregrine Financial Group, no FCM bankruptcy has
resulted in any major shortfall to a Customer Segregated Account of an FCM. 24 Thus, the CEA for
over 75 years and applicable CFTC regulations
provided important customer protections to futures customers. The Sentinel II case could result
in even a greater loss of customer confidence in
the U.S. futures markets, just as the recent MF
Global and Peregrine FCM bankruptcies have, if
the 7th Circuit affirms Judge Zagel's decision.
The IAA, enacted in 1940 following the Great
Depression, does not have any such customer
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asset protection erovisions as the CEA. Section
206(4) of the IAA merely gives the SEC the right
to adopt anti-fraud regulations to apply to investment advisers. 25 In 1962, the SEC adopted SEC
Rule 206(4)-2, which requires investment advisers to hold customer assets with a bank, a brokerdealer or an FCM. 26 The IA Custody Rule, as it
is commonly called, does not require many of the
regulatory obligations and restrictions imposed
on FCMs by the CFTC with respect to customer
asset accounts, namely:

1. Investment Advisers are not required to
maintain any minimum net capital amounts,
whereas FCMs must maintain very large
amounts of regulatory capital;27
2.

Investment Advisers are not required to obtain detailed "acknowledgement letters"
from each custodian or depository that holds
customer assets, as FCMs are required to; 28

3. Investment Advisers are not required to report the amounts held in these custodial accounts as FCMs are required to do;29
4. Investment Advisers are not required to invest any of their own capital into their customer custody account whereas all FCMs do
so;30 and
5. Investment Advisers are not subject to a large
number of very specific rules relating to these
custody accounts as FCMs are. 31

Judge Zagel's First Conclusion

of law
Sentinel II is a case of first impression regarding the bankruptcy of a firm registered as both an
FCM and as an IA. The issue before Judge Zagel
in Sentinel II was whether the statutory trust created by Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA was
superior to the IA Custody Rule adopted by the
SEC. Defendant FCStone made several arguments
in support of this theory, namely:

1. The customer protections provided by Congress in Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 were stronger
than those resulting from a single SEC regulation requiring funds to be held with a cus-
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todian. In fact, Congress has never enacted
any such similar provision in the IAA.
2.

Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA emphatically states that the assets held in a
Customer Segregated Account must be
treated as customer property "belonging
to" the customer regardless of their location. In other words, the CEA created a
"floating trust" over such customer property32 whereas the IA Custody Rule merely
requires that customer assets only be segregated from the IA's own assets. Therefore,
Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) made clear that
the statutory trust imposed on customer
segregated funds means that the assets in
question, e.g., the SEG 1 Pool assets, could
never be treated as the property of the depository (e.g., Sentinel). Therefore, unless
the SEG 1 Pool assets become property of
the Sentinel estate, it could never be clawed
back by the Trustee and redistributed to the
SEG 3 Pool. Any such redistribution was
statutorily prohibited.

3.

The legislative history accompanying Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA clearly
demonstrate that segregation violations and
improper commingling of customer funds do
not destroy the statutory trust created under
the CEA. 33

4.

Congress did not intend to protect IA advisory client funds in the same manner as FCM
customer funds because no provision under
the IAA provides the specific customer protections that Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) do.

5. The risks unique to the futures markets demand that FCM customer-held property be
afforded heightened protections compared to
IA customer funds.
6.

The CFTC has promulgated a series of detailed regulations regarding how customer
assets must be held, reported and maintained
whereas the IA Custody Rule merely requires
that customer assets be held in one of three
types of custodian firms. 34

Judge Zagel did not accept any of these arguments and held that the IA Custody Rule is also a

Futures & Derivatives Law Report

statutory trust, just like Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b),
and that Congress did not intend to elevate protections for customer funds regulated by the CEA
and CFTC regulations over customer funds regulated by the IA Custody Rule. He then stated:
"there is no basis in law for elevating one federal
statutory trust over another absent the tracing of
specific property." 35 Judge Zagel basically holds
that when two trusts require segregation, without
analyzing any other requirement, then the two
trusts must be treated equally. He then stated:
"Until Congress demonstrates a clear intention to give commodity customers socalled 'super priority' in bankruptcy, I have
no basis for elevating the interests of the
CEA over !AA-protected customers." 36

Query, will the Seventh Circuit accept Judge
Zagel's analysis? I do not think so. While the IA
Custody Rule does create a "regulatory" trust,
the simple requirement of segregation under the
IA Custody Rule should not elevate that regulation to an equivalent statutory trust created by
the CEA. If Congress wanted to create a statutory
trust under the IAA, a law enacted four years after Section 4d(a) was added to the CEA, it could
have done so. Instead, all Congress did was to
give the SEC the authority to adopt a general
anti-fraud rule. True, Congress knows that SEC
Rule 206(4)-2 requires an investment adviser to
place customer funds with a third party custodian. However, one cannot elevate Congressional
intent, as Judge Zagel seems to have done, to hold
that a specific statutory trust regarding how futures customer funds are held to be treated the
same as an SEC regulation regarding customer assets held by a custodian selected by an investment
adviser. Statutory construction simply should not
work that way. One must look to the legislative
history in analyzing the respective laws. And nowhere will you find any legislative history regarding the use of a custodian by investment advisers.
That is because no such law existed at the time of
the Sentinel bankruptcy filing. 37 If Congress wanted to treat both types of trusts as equal, as Judge
Zagel has done, then the SEC should have sought
such specific legislation regarding funds. managed
by an IA. Moreover, Judge Zagel ignored all of the
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specific regulations applicable to FCMs regarding
how customer funds must be held in trust3 8 and
that IAs, such as Sentinel, could have placed its
customer assets with a broker-dealer or an FCM,
and thus have received special asset protections. 39
In its Amicus Brief filed in Sentinel II in the
Seventh Circuit, the CFTC argued that while the
language of Section 4d (and related Section 4(d)
(b)) does not actually use the word 'trust', "the
rights and duties they create are precisely the sort
that establish a trust both at common law and
in other statutory concepts. The statutory scheme
defines a res subject to the trust-the cash and
property received by the FCM from its customers. " 40 The CFTC then added: "And the statute
and the implementing regulations impose a variety of restrictions on how the res can be treated
by the FCM." 41 The CFTC then states that "Section 54 l(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
the property of the bankruptcy estate does not
include property in which the debtor holds (e.g.,
Sentinel). " 42 It only holds legal title but not equitable title. 43 It goes on to state:
"While section 6d relies on segregation
as an important protection for commodity
customer funds, its reach extends to customer assets that an FCM or depository
acting for an FCM has improperly failed
to keep segregated" .... But the provision
(e.g., Section 6d) also separately requires
that the FCM "treat and deal with all money, securities and property (received from
a customer to serve as margin) ... as belonging to such customer." 44

The CFTC in its Amicus Brief then stated, referring to the statement made by Judge Zagel that
the assets held by Sentinel were subject to a statutory trust arising out of SEC regulations, and thus
gave Sentinel's securities customers an equally enforceable claim to the same trust protections as
the SEG 1 Pool:
"The CFTC believes that this holding, by
treating commodity customer funds as
property of the entity holding them (e.g.,
as assets of the bankrupt estate) rather
than the property of customers, is funda-
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mentally inconsistent with 7 U.S.C. § 6d
and, if upheld, could have consequences
for the security of commodity customer
funds going beyond the facts of this particular case.

The district court's conclusion does not
follow from its premises. The court's reasoning at most establishes a reason for
some degree of parity treatment between
commodity and securities customers. It
does not justify treating customer funds as
simply the property of the debtor, making
them available for payment to creditors
generally."45

The SEC in its Amicus Brief in Sentinel II in the
Seventh Circuit obviously argued differently. It
stated as follows:
"In the SEC's views, contrary to FCStone's
position, the custody rule provides advisory clients with segregated asset protection
for client property that is as strong and as
important as the segregated assets protection the CEA and related regulations provide to commodities customers." 46

The SEC, like the CFTC, applied the ongoing
trust principle by stating:
"The import of (the custody rule) ... is that
client funds never lose that character merely because an investment adviser ... takes
possession of them." Citing Griffiths v. Peterson, 96 B.R. 314, 323 (Bankr. D. Colo 1988)"47

The SEC went on to hold that there is no basis
in law for elevating one federal statutory trust over
another absent the tracing of specific property. 48
That argument thus raises the fundamental
question before the Seventh Circuit. Do the specific customer segregation provisions set forth in
the CEA and several CFTC regulations trump or
not trump one SEC regulation. The relevant CEA
section goes back to 1936 and was later amended in 1968 to extend the segregation obligation
to custodians receiving segregated funds from
FCMs. The applicable CFTC regulations have
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also been around for decades. The applicable provision in the IAA merely gives the SEC the right
to establish anti-fraud regulations for investment
advisers. Using this statutory authority, the SEC
adopted the IA Custody Rule. Query, are these
two trusts equitable or competing?49 Should the
commingling of the securities sold to Citadel have
any impact on the rights of the futures customers regarding their assets held in the SEG 1 Pool?
I believe that the Seventh Circuit will overturn
Judge Zagel's view that "equality is equity."

Judge Zagel's Second Conclusion
of Law
Judge Zagel also held that FCStone is subject to
.. common law tracing due to the co-equal claims of
the competing trust claimants. He then stated that
FCStone failed to meet this tracing standard. In
fact, he stated that such tracing was impossible.
FCStone's expert did in fact identify the location
of the SEG 1 Pool assets but this, according to the
court, is indicative of why tracing is not possible
in this case. He then stated:
"But for tracing purposes, the critical
shortcoming of Ms. McCloskey's report
is that it fails to adequately account for
the fact that none of Sentinel's customers
(referring to the FCMs) held specific ownership interests in securities. Rather they
own pro rata portions of investment portfolios which Sentinel was free to fill with
any of the securities in its pool of assets so
long as those securities met the portfolio's
investment criteria."

Judge Zagel believed that the "fungible nature
of cash alone makes it impossible to trace specific
securities back to the original customer deposits
in this case. " 50 He then stated:
"So, commingling aside, Sentinel's investment model makes tracing essentially impossible because, upon deposit, customer
funds were immediately converted into
an abstract ownership interest. In other
words. Sentinel's pooled investment model renders tracing impracticable because
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there is no specific form of converted trust property to trace. " 51

In support of FCStone's position and that of the
CFTC, the critical case to analyze is Begierv. l.R.S.52
Begier holds, in essence, that trust assets should
not be deemed property of the bankrupt estate
and that tracing is not required if a nexus can
be shown between the assets received by the
beneficiary and those held in trust by the debtor. In its Amicus Brief in Sentinel II in the Seventh
Circuit case, the CFTC stated:

"The nexus approach requires that the federal trust claimant must establish 'some
connection' between the original trust assets defined by the relevant statute and
the 'assets sought to be applied' to the
trust claim subsequently in circumstances
where the original trust assets have been
commingled or transferred (citing Begier,
496 U.S. at 65-66). The court has flexibility in
determining what connection is sufficient
in particular circumstances so long as it
'applies reasonable assumptions to govern
the tracing of funds .. .' These reasonable
assumptions can include, but are not restricted to, common law tracing.'' 53

Judge Zagel held that, since the FCMs deposited cash with Sentinel, such cash is intangible and
cannot be traced. 54 The SEC in its Amicus Brief
concurred with Judge Zagel and distinguished
Begier by stating that Begier is inapplicable as Begier did not involve competing claims by beneficiaries of two trusts, as applies here. 55
I also believe that the Seventh Circuit will disagree with Judge Zagel's analysis on this point
as well. The CEA requires all FCMs to "treat
and deal with all money, securities and property received ... to margin, guarantee, or secure
the trades or contracts of any customer of such
person, or accruing to such customer ... " 56 • The
term "money" clearly refers to cash. Section
4d(b) further requires that depositories of commodity customer funds not "hold, dispose of, or
use any such assets as belonging to the depositing futures commission merchant or any person
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other thq_n the customers of such futures commission merchant. "57
While Sentinel was registered as an FCM, it is
also acting as a depository for FCStone and the
other FCMs that invested their customer assets
through Sentinel. At all times, the customer assets must be held in segregation and be treated
as belonging to futures customers. No such law
or rule applies to investment advisers. The fact
that Sentinel improperly commingled the SEG 1
Pool assets with the SEG 3 Pool assets does not
remove this statutory trust feature from the FCM
customer funds. Regardless of the location of the
customer assets of FCStone, this statutory trust
continues to apply. In essence, a floating trust applies, and continues to apply, to these customer
assets at all times once the customer assets are
deposited in a customer segregated account. That
was the clear Congressional intent.
Moreover, Judge Zagel does not understand
how customer segregation works in the futures
industry. An FCM opens a Customer Segregated Account at a custodian bank. Its customers directly transfer their "cash, securities and
property" into the FCM's Customer Segregated
Account at the custodian bank, a commingled
omnibus-type account. The mere commingling
of customer assets in these customer segregated
accounts, which is clearly permitted by the CEA
and applicable CFTC regulations, does not destroy the statutory trust.
The FCM may never hold such funds held in
these customer segregated accounts as belonging to the FCM. The FCM, as a clearing member
firm, also acts as an agent on behalf of its customers and will transfer such customer cash, securities or property to the clearing house if any initial
or variation margin is required to be transferred.
The assets held at the clearing house are also
maintained in a different commingled customer
segregated account. In other words, the customer's property is always required to be maintained
in segregation. IAs, on the other hand, can receive
customer property and then transfer it into one
of three custodial accounts-at a broker-dealer
(e.g., the most typical way), to another FCM (if it
involves futures) or to a custodian bank. Sentinel
chose the latter. Had it chosen either of the first
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two apgroaches, the customer funds held in the
SEG 3 Pool would have been protected.
Also, many futures customers give cash to their
FCM to meet their initial margin obligations.
The FCM must account for and report various
financial information to the customer, including
the customer's total amount of cash, securities
or property held by the FCM on its behalf. This
accounting clearly satisfies the tracing element.
FCStone's experts proved that. They were able
to trace every dollar received by Sentinel from
each FCM for investment in the SEG 1 Pool.
The fact that cash is intangible should not control this analysis. In fact, when cash is received
by an FCM, CFTC Rule 1.25 clearly permits
an FCM to invest customer assets provided that
any such investments comply with the permissible restricted investments. Therefore, an FCM
can take customer cash, which is fungible, invest
such cash in U.S. government securities, which
is what FCStone did through Sentinel. However,
the government securities that are purchased by
the FCM with the customer's cash belongs to and
are held at all times for the benefit of the customers. Such government securities must be held
in a Customer Segregated Account at all times.
Regardless of their location, these government
securities are deemed to be "customer property",
that is, funds belonging to the FCM's customers
whether the underlying assets are held in cash
or government securities purchased by the FCM
with such cash. All customer "monies, securities
and property" held in these customer segregated
accounts are held by the FCM as "belonging to
the customer. " 58
Therefore, the common law tracing requirement imposed by Judge Zagel simply should not
apply here. All such assets at all times belong to
and for the benefit of the customers of that FCM
regardless of what form the assets now take or
their location. The applicable CFTC regulations
require that there is a proper amount of funds
held in the Customer Segregated Account regardless of their form. Thus, if an FCM invests
$100,000 of cash received from ABC, a futures
customer, into a $100,000 Treasury bill, ABC's
name need not be placed on that T-Bill. The TBill purchased with such cash is held in the Cus-
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tomer Segregration Account of the FCM just
like the cash would be. An FCM invests not just
ABC's cash but the cash of all customers held
in the omnibus Customer Segregated Account
when making such permissible investments
under CFTC Rule 1.25. The key is not whether ABC's $100,000 in cash can be identified
through any specific investment but that ABC's
assets are protected, whether they be in same or
like kind. In fact, CFTC Rule 190.10 specifically
states that U.S. Treasury bills are not deemed to
be "specially identifiable property" but are to be
treated as cash.59 The fact that Ms. McCloskey
could follow the movement of the exact amount
that should have been held in Sentinel's Customer Segregated Account should satisfy any tracing
requirement. 60

Judge Zagel's Third Conclusion
of Law
Judge Zagel held that the transfer of assets to
the Customer Segregated Accounts of FCStone
(and all of the other FCMs) was not authorized
by the Bankruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy
Court. As noted above, the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Illinois authorized this distribution on August 20, 2007. 61
Judge Zagel stated that the Bankruptcy Court did
issue an Order stating that the assets, less a $15.6
million holdback, could be distributed to the Customer Segregated Accounts of the various FCMs.
Judge Zagel then stated that the Order said nothing about whether the proceeds were property
of the estate. Approximately, one year later, on
August 8, 2008, the Trustee for Sentinel filed a
Motion to Clarify or in the Alternative to Vacate
or Modify the Court's August 20, 2007 Order. In
open court, the judge then explained that the August 20, 2007 Order had not ruled on the "property of the estate" issue.
From a practical perspective, the funds distributed to FCStone's customers in August 2007 belonged to its customers who were free to remove
those funds from FCStone. This distribution was
clear and should be enforced. To hold otherwise
will greatly jeopardize the U.S. futures markets as
how will any FCM know whether the FCM may
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later be held liable for funds distributed to a third
party, namely its customers, five years earlier?
FCStone, and all of the other FCMs, must be permitted to rely on a Court Order as they did back
in August 2007. In fact, several of the FCMs then
queried other regulators to inquire whether these
funds could ever be claw-backed; the regulators
said "no." If they knew that they could be claw
backed five years later, these funds might have
been held in trust pending a further outcome.
To hold as Judge Zagel did implies that an
FCM is liable for the acts of any depository that
it selects to hold customer assets. Sentinel was a
depository that was registered as an FCM. There
has never been any CFTC pronouncement that
an FCM is liable under these circumstances. 62 In
fact, it was just recently that the CFTC has raised
this issue and has asked for comments whether an
FCM should be held to be so liable.63 This regulation or even an advisory has never been publicly
pronounced by the CFTC.
Finally, Judge Zagel focused on one word in the
Authorization Order; that is, that the custodian
bank "may" immediately distribute the Proceeds
to Debtor's clients. Judge Zagel then stated that
the Authorization Order reserved some rights.
However, these rights appear to involve the right
of the Trustee to seek legal action with respect to
the "holdback" 64 (e.g., the amount held back pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's Order) and any
actions regarding claims for priority under Section 761-767.65
One year later, the Bankruptcy Court issued
an Order clarifying that it never ruled that the
Citadel proceeds distributed were or were not
property of the bankrupt estate. Query, should
this Order issued one year later, which Judge Zagel relied upon, override the authorization test.
If any transfer of property, including property of
the bankrupt estate, had been authorized, it cannot be claw backed.66
Judge Zagel's ruling could have serious impact
on future FCM bankruptcies. It raises questions
about the ability of an FCM to accept customer
assets from a failed FCM not knowing whether
such customer assets may be clawed back in the
future. Moreover, FCMs are not currently required to be held liable by the acts of another
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FCM or a depository regarding customer funds
that it has given to such entities.67

INITIAL TRANSFEREE ISSUE IN
SENTINEL/I
Another critical issue arising from Sentinel II is
whether FCStone was an "initial transferee" or
not. In other words, was the distribution made to
FCStone's Customer Segregated Account for the
benefit of FCStone or not. Judge Zagel concluded
that it was. 68 This finding was critical or the postpetition distributions made on August 20, 2007
to the Customer Segregated Accounts of the various FCMs could not be voided.
Interestingly, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code does
not define the term "initial transferee." The various circuits have applied different theories to define this term. The Seventh Circuit has applied
a "dominion and control" test to determine the
initial transferee test. 69 To meet this test, the party
must have dominion over the money or other assets and the right to put the money to one's own
purpose. 70 I believe that the Seventh Circuit will
also decide against Judge Zagel on this issue.
FCMs merely act as a conduit over their futures
customer assets. As noted above, all futures customer assets are held in a customer segregated account, and all "monies, securities and property"
held in these segregated accounts constitute "customer property" belonging to the customers of
the FCM. The FCM merely acts as a trustee over
such funds, transferring the underlying assets either to a clearing house or back to the customer,
as the case may be. True, an FCM may invest such
customer property, pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.25
as noted above, but all such investments, and any
interest earned on such investments, constitute
"customer property" while held in the customer
segratated account. Under such circumstances,
they do not belong to the FCM until such interest is distributed from the customer segratated account to the FCM.
Judge Zagel acknowledged that this is a case of
first impression on this issue relating to an FCM.
All prior cases involve the liquidation of a stock
brokerage firm which clearly have the right to use
customer assets on behalf of the broker-dealer. In
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deciding this issue, Judge Zagel focused on t~e
fact that FCMs deposit their own capital, normally referred to as "residual interest", into their
Customer Segregated Accounts. FCMs make such
capital investment in order to ensure that the assets in these specially-protected accounts equal
or exceed the required amount, and thus avoid a
shortfall. 71 Judge Zagel opined that since FCMs
function "as a de facto guarantor for all of its customer funds invested with Sentinel'', then it must
be an initial transferee. 72
This is where Judge Zagel's logic fails, in my
opinion, and the Seventh Circuit will reverse his
decision. As noted above, there has never been a
pronouncement that an FCM acts as a guarantor over assets that it may deposit with a depository and that depository, for whatever reason,
misappropriates such customer assets. The role
of the residual interest merely provides a buffer
to ensure against a shortfall. Once deposited,
the residual interest constitutes "customer property" in the customer segregated account. Until
just recently, no FCM was even required to make
a residual interest in its customer segregated account. 73 The mere fact that FCMs do deposit their
own funds in their customer segregated accounts
should not cause them to become an initial transferee. FCMs merely hold their customer funds in
trust and act a mere conduit with respect to them.
The post-petition distributions were, in my opinion, made solely for the benefit of the customers
of the FCMs.74

POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN SENTINEL P5
In a prior case involving Sentinel, Frederick
Grede as the Liquidation Trustee, filed a case
against Bank of New York Mellon ("BONY"),
which acted as the custodian for Sentinel's repo
and futures customer accounts. Grede sought
$312 million from BONY claiming that BONY
knew about Sentinel's fraudulent use of its customer assets and thus BONY acted inequitably
and unlawfully. On August 12, 2012, Judge
Zagel ruled that BONY was not liable for the
actions taken by Sentinel with respect to its
fraudulent movement of assets from its customer
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accounts to an account held in the name of Sentinel on BONY's books. Judge Zagel found that
Grede had "failed to prove that Sentinel made
the Transfers with the actual intent to hinder,
delay or defraud its creditors. " 76 On November 30, 2012, without any explanation, the
Seventh Circuit vacated Judge Zagel's decision
in Sentinel I and held that this appeal remains
under consideration by the panel. 77 On August
26, 2013, the Seventh Circuit overturned Judge
Zagel's lower court decision regarding Grede's
fraudulent transfer and equitable subordination
claims and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.
In its decision in Sentinel I, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with Judge Zagel's analysis of several of the facts and thus his conclusion of the
law. For example, the Seventh Circuit disagreed
.. with Judge Zagel's conclusion that the transfer
of such funds to purchase the repos in Sentinel's
name at BONY "was not enough to show that
Sentinel had the actual intent to hinder, delay or
defraud its FCM clients." 78 The Seventh Circuit
then stated that Sentinel's pledge of the segregated funds "was driven by a desire to stay in
business correctly identified the motive. " 79 The
Seventh Circuit then concluded that such motivation did constitute the "actual intent" and thus
constituted a fraudulent transfer. 80 The Seventh
Circuit further believed that Sentinel did in fact
expose "its FCM clients to a substantial risk of
loss of which they were unaware when it pledged
funds that were supposed to remain segregated
for the FCM clients. " 81
The Seventh Circuit then states:
"Sentinel's pledge of the segregated funds
as collateral for its own loans becomes
particularly egregious when viewed in
light of the legal requirements imposed
on Sentinel by the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA). Again, even if we assume that
Sentinel eventually intended to replace
the segregated funds and earn greater returns for their FCM clients, Sentinel knew
that its pledge of the segregated funds
violated the CEA. The CEA exists explicitly
for the purpose of "ensur(ing) the financial integrity of all transactions" involv-
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ing FCMs, "avoid(ing systemic risk", and
"protect(ing) all market participants from
... misuses of customer assets." 7 U.S.C.
§ S(b). In order to further these aims, the
CEA requires that the "money, securities,
and property (belonging to clients) shall
be separately accounted for and shall not
be commingled with the funds of such
commission merchant." 7 U.S.C. § G(d)(a)
(2). Moreover, 7 U.S.C. § G(d)(b) makes it
"unlawful; for an FCM "to hold, dispose of,
or use any such money, securities, or property as belonging to the depositing futures
commission merchant." 82

One possible consequence if the lower court, on
remand, rules that BONY must equitably subordinate its secured claim to unsecured claim status
and the Seventh Circuit in Sentinel II affirms the
claw back, then it is quite possible that a large
amount of the Sentinel estate could be redistributed back to BONY. Query, is this something that
the regulators and the courts have contemplated?
The Seventh Circuit has previously ruled that
the CFTC has "exclusive jurisdiction" over the
futures markets in cases brought by the SEC83
and in favor of FCM's actions regarding the consequences of a customer's default in not making
the required margin payments. 84 In light of the
recent FCM bankruptcies involving MF Global
and Peregrine Financial Group, and given the language noted above in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Sentinel I, I believe that the Seventh Circuit
will reverse Judge Zagel's decision in Sentinel II.
Nowhere in its opinion does the Seventh Circuit
mention the SEG 3 Pool in Sentinel I. Its decision
focused solely on the protections afforded futures
customers under the CEA.

IMPACT OF MADOFF CASE BEFORE
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
In In Re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC,85 the Second Circuit must decide
whether the SIPA Trustee appointed to handle the
Madoff broker-dealer bankruptcy may or may
not claw back any assets distributed to Madoff
customers regarding assets acquired in the Ponzi
scheme. Although this claw back issue is not di-
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reedy related to the claw back issue in Sentinel II,
the legal issues are, that is, how Section 546(e) of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted.
The Madoff case also involves competing interests, that is, what should the legislative policies
be when the policies of the securities laws collide
with the policies of the bankruptcy laws. Query,
it would have been a more interesting case if Sentinel had, in fact, deposited its SEG 3 Pool assets
with a broker-dealer instead of with the Bank of
New York Mellon, and the assets of the SEG 1
and SEG3 Pools would have been commingled.
The issue in Madoff is whether the safe harbor
provisions in Section 546(e) should or should
not apply. The Second Circuit must weigh the
impact as to whether Madoff did not actually
buy the underlying securities versus whether the
SIPA Trustee does not have the right to claw back
withdrawals by securities investors from their securities accounts many years before because, unbeknownst to these customers, Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme. Does this sound similar?
Did the FCM Defendants know that Sentinel was
commingling the SEG 1 Pool assets with the SEG
3 Pool assets?
Section 546(e) involves "transactions involving
financial markets." 86 And Section 546(e) continues to be amended "to expand its scope to accommodate and protect evolving markets. " 87 In its
Arnie us Brief, SIFMA adds: " ... while Madoff's
fraud was extraordinary, the agreements between
Madoff and its investors were commonplace. " 88 It
will be interesting to see how the Seventh Circuit
in Sentinel II and the Second Circuit in Madoff
will decide these two cases of first impression.
Section 546(e) was also cited by Judge Zagel
regarding a second distribution to FCStone in
the amount of $1,097,925 on August 17, 2007. 89
FCStone argued that this transfer was made in
connection with a securuites contract and thus
protected by the safe harbor provisions of Section 546(e) whereas the Trustee argued that the
transfer did not fall within the securities contract
requirements. Judge Zagel declined to rule on this
issue as he did not believe that Congress intended
to apply the safe harbor provisions of 546(e) to
this case.90
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CONCLUSION
FCStone has appealed Judge Zagel's ruling. It
will be interesting to see how the Seventh Circuit
might rule in Sentinel II. The oral arguments
were held in the Seventh Circuit on December
10, 2013. The Seventh Circuit, more than any
other circuit, has a great understanding of the
futures markets and has often issued decisions
based on the economic impact of a lower court's
decision. In my opinion, I believe that the Seventh Circuit will reverse Judge Zagel's lower
court decision in Sentinel II and order a retrial.
To rule otherwise means that the Seventh Circuit would allow the claw back to occur, some
six years after the customer funds were distributed to the FCStone's Customer Segregated Account, which will have a devastating effect on
FCMs and the futures industry.
The CFTC and the exchanges, in the event of
an FCM's bankruptcy, reach out to other FCMs
to accept the non-defaulting customers of the
failed FCM. If a claw back is later permitted, why
should FCMs work with the CFTC and the exchanges in such circumstances. The CEA provisions and specific CFTC regulations dealing with
protecting customer assets should, in this author's
opinion, trump the SEC regulation on the IA Custody Rule. It's unfortunate that the customer assets held in the SEG 3 Pool might not be treated
equitably, but Sections 4d of the CEA and CFTC
Regulations 1.20 through 1.29, which are quite
detailed in nature, should be the rule of law in
this case.
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